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ADDRESS AT THE PRINCETON UNIVERSITY BICENTENNIAL
CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF MATHEMATICS
(DECEMBER 17–19, 1946), BY ALFRED TARSKI
Edited with additional material and an introduction by HOURYA SINACEUR
Abstract. This article presents Tarski’s Address at the Princeton Bicentennial Conference
on Problems of Mathematics, together with a separate summary. Two accounts of the discus-
sion which followed are also included. The central topic of the Address and of the discussion
is decision problems. The introductory note gives information about the Conference, about
the background of the subjects discussed in the Address, and about subsequent developments
to these subjects.
The Princeton University Bicentennial Conference on Problems of Math-
ematics took place during December 17–19, 1946. It was the first major
international gathering of mathematicians after WorldWar II. About eighty
guests participated, among them a dozen from abroad andmany of the lead-
ing American mathematicians. In 1947 the University printed a pamphlet
(henceforth called the Pamphlet) containing a foreword by Solomon Lef-
schetz, Director of the Conference, a list of eighty-two invited participants,
a program of ten sessions on different fields of mathematics, and a summary
of the discussion in each of the sessions with a brief foreword by J. W. Tukey,
Conference Reporter, who announced that a volume of proceedings would
be published under the title: Problems ofMathematics. However, this project
was never carried through because of lack of funds.
§1. The printed Pamphlet. From the Conference Program printed in the
Pamphlet we learn that the session onMathematical Logic took place on the
first evening of the Conference, Tuesday, December 17, after dinner at 8:00
p.m.1 Alonzo Church was chairman, Alfred Tarski discussion leader, and
Received August 8, 1998; revised September 9, 1999.
I am greatly indebted to Leon Henkin, who gave me copies of the material published
here and other relevant documents, encouraging this editing project, and was always will-
ing to listen to my questions and to answer them. I thank the Editors of BSL for their
encouragement and especially Charles Parsons for profitable discussions and remarks. Last
but not least, I thank warmly John W. Addison, Martin Davis, Solomon Feferman, Wilfrid
Hodges, and Robert Vaught, for extensive and very precise comments and corrections on
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J. C. C.McKinsey reporter. According to the list published in the Pamphlet,
other participating logicians were Kurt Go¨del, Stephen C. Kleene, W. V.
Quine, Raphael M. Robinson and J. Barkley Rosser. Some of these gave
invited talks. A summary of the mathematical logic session was prepared
by McKinsey, but what was printed in the Pamphlet was not his original
report. In a letter to Tarski, dated May 18, 1947, McKinsey wrote: “I
received the little booklet from Princeton describing the logic meeting there.
This has been changed very much since I wrote it. As you notice, Tukey
says in his introduction that he takes responsibility for the omissions —
and it seems to me that in the case of the logic session he has omitted a
great deal that I put in.”2 Moreover, from McKinsey’s letter dated May 5,
1947, we learn that “the «popular» account of the logic session” did not
please Tarski. Nevertheless, it is interesting to republish this account here
along with the transcript of Tarski’s talk (B1) and the general discussion
(B2). This account, consisting of McKinsey’s report as modified by Tukey,
will be named (C) in what follows. The document (C) differs from the
transcript (B1) on one significant point, apparently quoting Tarski’s own
words (see Note 28 to (B1)).
The account (C) contains no listing of the individual talks made in the
session. It just mentions Church, Tarski, Go¨del, Kleene, McKinsey, Quine,
andRosser as speakers in the session, without specifying in each casewhether
the person in question gave an invited talk or only spoke during the general
discussion, after the invited talks. However, two living logicians have given
my drafts. Thanks to Mary Ann Addison, who is Alonzo Church’s daughter, I became
aware that the Alonzo Church Nachlass contains a folder entitled “Bicentennial Conference
Correspondence”. Addison sent me some material from this folder that I could use before
completing my work. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to Addison, who made new
suggestions on the entire manuscript in its next to last draft. I thank also Jan Tarski for
comments and suggestions on a late version. I remain, however, solely responsible for any
mistakes encompassed in the text. I also wish to thank the Dibner Institute for the History
of Science and Technology, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a fellowship
during the fall 1997, during which time much of the preliminary work on this introduction
was done.
(Note by the editors of the Bulletin) Of the documents published below, the first three,
“A summary of the address to be given by Alfred Tarski at the conference on The Problems
of Mathematics in Princeton, December 17, 1946” (A), “Talk by Prof. Tarski at the Logic
Conference, December 1946, Princeton” (B1), “Discussion in the conference on logic held
at Princeton Dec. 17 1946” (B2), are in the Alfred Tarski papers (BANC MSS 84/69 c,
carton 12, folder 4) in the Bancroft Library of the University of California, Berkeley. They
are published here by permission of the Bancroft Library, the first two also by permission
of Dr. Jan Tarski. The remaining document, “Mathematical Logic” (C), is excerpted from
the booklet Problems of Mathematics, issued by Princeton University in 1947. It is reprinted
here by permission of Princeton University.
The editors wish to thank Leon Henkin and Jan Tarski for bringing the documents (A),
(B1), and (B2) to light and encouraging their publication, and the staff of the Bancroft
Library and Solomon and Anita Feferman for assistance.
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evidence concerning the logic session. First Quine, in his Autobiography
(pp. 195–196) published in 1985, wrote that he “was invited to participate
along with Go¨del, Kleene, Rosser, and others”. He writes there about
Go¨del’s talk, which was likely preceded by Rosser’s. Indeed, Quine describes
Go¨del pacing back and forth and glancing “at a pair of symbols that Rosser
had happened to leave on the blackboard”. Second, Leon Henkin was
working on a Ph.D. dissertation at Princeton University under Church at
that time and attended the session on mathematical logic. He remembers
being asked by A. W. Tucker, one of the Conference organizers, to take
notes on “three of the talks to be given there: Church, Go¨del, and Tarski”.
He remembers that Quine was another invited speaker, and possibly also
Kleene. Since Church was chairman andMcKinsey was the reporter for the
session, the invited speakerswere, as I presume, Tarski, chosen as “discussion
leader”, Go¨del, Kleene, Quine, and Rosser. This is corroborated by a letter
fromChurch to Tarski dated June 20, 1946, kept in the ChurchNachlass and
sent to me by John W. Addison Jr. when my work was nearly complete. Let
me quote large passages of this letter:
“The forthcoming conference onmathematics to be held at Princeton
is intended to be a conference on problems in mathematics. The
speakers at each session will be asked to devote their time, not to
setting forth new results of their own or to explaining the results of
others, but to a survey of important outstanding problems in the field
of that session, with discussion where appropriate of the significance
of the problem, and possibly suggestions towards an attack on it.
Such speeches should not be expository, for the benefit of persons ill
acquainted with the field, but should be addressed to those actively
interested in the field. (Of course it is not meant by this to exclude
discussion of the relevance of the particular field to other fields; on
the contrary, this question of interrelationship of different fields will
often arise in connection with particular problems.)
In special connection with the session on mathematical logic, be-
sides yourself, Kleene, Quine, and Rosser have received invitations
and have accepted. No special invitations were issued to persons
who will be at Princeton University or at the Institute but of course
we are counting also on the presence of Go¨del and McKinsey.
My plan for the session is that you should give the leading address,
devoting thirty-five minutes to a survey of problems in the field of
mathematical logic, and that this would be followed by ten-minute
addresses by Go¨del, Kleene, Quine, Rosser. You would be asked to
prepare your address long in advance and to send copies to the other
four speakers and to me. The function of the other speakers would
be to discuss further the problems proposed by you, and to introduce
additional problems, especially such as they were themselves actively
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interested in. As chairman I would reserve the right to include an
address myself at any point and of any length — or not to speak
myself at all — the decision to be made after seeing whether I had
anything to add to the remarks of others.
After the prepared addresses the meeting would be thrown open
for general discussion, in which, of course, further remarks by the
original speakers would not be excluded. McKinsey would be asked
to serve as reporter, to prepare the material for publication. This
would give him a heavy responsibility especially in connection with
the impromptu discussion, as of course he would be provided with
copies of the prepared addresses.
I am writing to ask whether you approve the plan, and especially
whether you will undertake the principal address as proposed.”
Clearly Tarski accepted the proposal. From the Church correspondence
folder we also learn that Tarski did indeed prepare his summary in advance.
Kleene, in a letter to Church dated November 29, 1946, says, “I got Tarski’s
summary of his talk a little over a week ago, and I did want to orient my brief
one in relation to that”. Tarski himself alludes to the prepared summary he
sent toGo¨del too before the PrincetonConference. In a letter toGo¨del dated
December 10, 1946, recently edited by Jan Tarski,3 he says: “As you see from
the summary of my talk, my program is rather ambitious and probably too
comprehensive; and you can easily realize that within a 30-minute talk I shall
merely be able to touch upon most of the problems involved.”
The account (C) begins by stating that “the discussion revolved about a
single broad topic — decision problems”. Actually, that was the topic of
Tarski’s talk, whichwas the “leading address” of the session. Takinghis point
of departure from Tarski’s lecture, Go¨del wrote some remarks on possible
absolute notions of definability and demonstrability. The four-page paper
was sent to McKinsey for the planned proceedings that never appeared. It
was first published in [Davis, 1965, pp. 84–88] and has since become very
well known.4 By way of contrast, Tarski’s talk remained unpublished. What
happened to the other invited talks? In a privatemeeting arrangedbyCharles
Parsons on January 20, 1998, I asked Quine whether he had kept a draft of
his Princeton talk. He said that he “had no submitted paper and cannot
remember what he talked about”. I wrote to the Archives at the University
of Wisconsin, where S. C. Kleene taught mathematical logic. I learned from
the Director of the Archives that the box that contains Kleene’s papers from
1946 contains only correspondence and manifestly no draft of the Princeton
talk. As for Rosser’s talk nothing could be found that would appear to be of
reference to the Princeton Conference, at least at the Mathematics Research
Center inMadison,Wisconsin, whereRosser spent the last years of his career
in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
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§2. The material published here for the first time. In Fall 1994, Jan Tarski
brought Leon Henkin a copy of the material that had been found earlier
by Jan Wolen´ski in one of the boxes of his father’s papers that had been
deposited in the Bancroft Library after Tarski’s death in October 1983. This
material consisted of three parts. Part (A) is “A summary of the address to be
given by Alfred Tarski at the Conference on The Problems of Mathematics
in Princeton, December 17, 1946”; part (B1) is a ten-page typed document
entitled “Talk by Prof. Tarski at the Logic Conference, December 1946,
Princeton”; part (B2) is a six-page account of the discussion following the
invited talks.
Church’s letter to Tarski dated June 20, 1946, Kleene’s letter to Church
dated November 29, 1946, and the recently published letter from Tarski to
Go¨del quoted above confirm that the summary—part (A)—waswritten by
Tarski himself in advance. Typed neatly, (A) contains no errors while (B1)
and (B2) have some typographical errors and some typed words crossed out
and replaced by hand-written ones. According to Henkin,5 Tarski was not
accustomed to write out, in advance, the text of a talk to be given and (B1)
“projects very much the sense and the sound of Tarski’s speaking”.6 On the
other hand, Solomon Feferman, who attended Tarski’s classroom lectures
during 1948–1953, remembers that “Tarski often prepared notes, some quite
systematic, in advance, on folded sheets of paper, so that these read like a
little book. He did not necessarily refer to these notes directly in his lectures
since, having prepared them, he had clearly in mind what he was going to
say.” The prepared notes for the Princeton talk are the summary (A). As for
the text of the talk, Tarski did not write it down, in advance, even though he
was asked by Church to “prepare [it] long in advance and to send copies to
the other four speakers and tome”. In his letter toGo¨del datedDecember 10,
1946 mentioned above, Tarski says indeed: “Unfortunately, I cannot send
you a copy of my talk since I have none and I doubt whether the text will be
written down before my talk.”
Thus, (B1) could be a transcript made from a tape-recording of Tarski’s
talk, as Henkin supposes, or else an account prepared from notes taken
by someone who attended the talk. The latter possibility is supported by
McKinsey’s letter to Tarski, dated February 10, 1947. McKinsey indeed
began by writing: “I enclose copies of a text that has been prepared of your
address at Princeton, and also of the discussion which followed the prepared
addresses. These accounts were prepared fromnotes taken byMr. L. Henkin
and Kleene. I’m sorry to say that I felt so worried and depressed the night
of the meeeting that I wasn’t able to take any notes myself. I hope you’ll be
able to find the time soon to go over these manuscripts and offer suggestions
or corrections.”
Obviously, Tarski found no time to go over the copies he received from
McKinsey, that is the parts (B1) and (B2) of the material published here for
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the first time. Actually, on April 19, 1947, McKinsey made a new attempt,
writing: “Iwish youwould please look over themanuscript of your Princeton
address and send it back to me.” In a third letter (May 5, 1947), McKinsey
noted: “It’s too bad you won’t be able to give any time to the account of your
talk and of the discussion.” In a fourth letter (May 18, 1947), McKinsey
complained that his own report had been much shortened by Tukey and
urged Tarski to go over his talk “as soon as possible”. Tarski very probably
never went over the manuscripts of his talk and the general discussion at
the logic session of the Princeton conference, as the Proceedings volume
did not materialize. It is really a great pity, but (B1) and (B2) are not in
the final form Tarski would have given them. Indeed, it is fairly certain
that the handwritten corrections on some words of (B1) are not Tarski’s. I
publish (B1) and (B2) as they were, just correcting some few typographic
errors and adding only some obviously missing words, in square brackets,
and the numbering of paragraphs, in order to make easier references to the
different parts. The footnotes to (B1) are mine. They aim to explicate the
many allusions and results implicitly referred to in this 30-minute talk, which
was required to be not an expository speech, “for the benefit of persons ill
acquainted with the field, but . . . [an address] to those actively interested in
the field” (letter from Church to Tarski quoted above).
§3. Comments on (B1).
3.1. Choice of the decision problem. Let us begin by giving a summary
description of the structure of (B1). The twenty three paragraphs may be
grouped in the following way:
〈1–4〉 Introduction.
〈5–7〉 Decidability, recursiveness, and various notions of definability.
〈8–10〉 Generalities on the decision problem.
〈11–14〉 The decision problem for various logics.
〈15–17〉 Undecidable problems in number theory.
〈18–19〉 Undecidable problems in analysis and set theory.
〈20–22〉 The decision problem for algebraic systems and the notion of ele-
mentary equivalence.
〈23〉 A final word: relations between mathematics and logic.
This scheme roughly coincides with the plan given in the summary (A).
However, there is one single dissimilarity: the Point 10 of the summary (A)
mentions Go¨del’s and Gentzen’s work on consistency and the notion of
finitary proof, two themes totally missing in (B1). One reason for this
discrepancy may be the lack of time for dealing with the last point listed
in (A) before concluding.
I shall not comment one after the other on all the problems listed in (B1):
my footnotes in the present publication of (B1)may afford some information
on the historical context or the content of the solutions given to those
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problems, at least in case of either positively or negatively solved problems.
I shall rather try to focus here on some points which seem to me significant
with regard to Tarski’s work before and after 1946.
(B1) has some of the flavor of Hilbert’s famous address at the Interna-
tional Congress of Mathematicians which took place in Paris in 1900, since
it aims to survey unsolved problems in the domain of logic. But it deals
with one single theme, “the decision problem”, albeit in its many aspects or
relations to different mathematical disciplines. According to [Hilbert and
Ackermann, 1928], the general decision problem for first order-logic was
“the most important problem of symbolic logic” and, thus, was “the raison
d’eˆtre of metamathematics”, as Tarski comments in (B1).7 The negative
answer to the general decision problem was given in 1936 by Church,8 who
proved that there is no decision procedure that can determine for any sen-
tence of first-order logic whether or not it is provable. Church found indeed
a finitely axiomatizable undecidable fragment of arithmetic; it follows that
pure first-order logic in the language of the fragment is undecidable. But
some local decision methods were known for certain classes of sentences
within a logical or a mathematical theory. For instance, Lo¨wenheim gave a
decision method for the monadic first-order predicate calculus with equality
in 1915. Langford showed the decidability of the elementary theory of dense
linear order in 1927. But it must be noted that using here the expression
“decisionmethod” follows Tarski’s retrospective account— as it appeared in
print in his Introduction to [Tarski, 1948] — rather than that of Lo¨wenheim
or Langford themselves.9 By 1946 Tarski and his students had assembled
some good results on “the decision problem”, as listed in Paragraph 〈21〉 of
the Princeton talk, and some important questions related to this problem
were still unsolved, e.g., Hilbert’s tenth problem. That might explain Tarski’s
choice of decidability/undecidability for the Princeton address which should
survey “some outstanding problems in the field [of logic] . . . and possibly
[give] suggestions towards an attack on [them]”, as requested by the organiz-
ers of the Conference and notified by Church to Tarski (letter dated June 20,
1946, quoted above).
In his introduction (〈4〉), Tarski justified his choice historically (referring
toHilbert),materially (asserting in aHilbertian spirit that “the taskof logic is
to mechanize thinking”), and heuristically (diverse questions being possibly
“couched in terms of . . . this problem”). This latter justification may give
a hint about the failure to distinguish explicitly between unsolvable decision
problems for classes of sentences and undecidable, i.e., formally independent,
individual propositions. This failure may be puzzling, especially in 〈15–19〉.
But, the aim to gather “many diverse questions” under the single label “the
decision problem” may have led Tarski to disregard this distinction. Thus
Tarski’s statement at the end of 〈3〉 that he is taking “the decision problem” as
his main topic may bemisleading, if one understands “the decision problem”
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as it is currently understood anddoes not take into account thewhole context
and the fact that Tarski tried to have the most general view possible and to
give “a survey” of diverse outstanding problems.
In some sense, decidability and undecidability results were one of Tarski’s
main concerns since the years 1926–1928. More exactly, in a first period
whose end is to be set grosso modo around 1940, Tarski was chiefly interested
in deductive completeness problems. But he used for solving those problems
the method of effective elimination of quantifiers (EEQ),10 which affords
also a positive solution to the decidability of the theory under examination.
For instance, in the introduction to the first version of [Tarski, 1948], which
was submitted for publication in 1939 under the title The completeness of
elementary algebra and geometry, and published for the first time in 1967
([Tarski, 1939/1967]), Tarski stressed the following:
“It should be emphasized that the proofs sketchedbelowhave (like all
proofs of completeness hitherto published) an «effective» character
in the following sense: it is not merely shown that every statement of
a given theory is, so to speak, in principle provable or disprovable,
but at the same time a procedure is given which permits every such
statement actually to be proved or disproved by the means of proof
of the theory. By the aid of such a proof not only the problem of
completeness but also the decision problem is solved for the given
system in a positive sense. In other words, our results show that it
is possible to construct a machine which would provide the solution
of every problem in elementary algebra and geometry (to the extent
described above).”
One can say that, at a first stage of his career and given the method
used (namely EEQ), completeness and decidability were often inseparable
in Tarski’s mind and work. The quoted passage shows also that the link
betweendecisionprocedures andmechanizationof thoughtwasmade too. In
the revised text of [Tarski, 1931] we find a similar remark after the statement
of Theorem 2: “ . . . by analyzing the proof of this result, we see that there
is a mechanical method which enables us to decide in each particular case
whether a given sentence (of order 1) is provable or disprovable” ([Tarski,
1956, p. 134]). In both passages Tarski did not say any more than the bare
facts. Since recursion theory was not yet established at that date, it is hard
to see what else he could have done to pursue the idea. With the benefit of
hindsight, one can say that an algorithm for computing a recursive function
may be too “complex” and, therefore, could not be actually implemented
on a machine in a “reasonable” length of time. That means that not every
effective decision procedure is feasible. In particular, according to a result
proved by M. J. Fischer and M. O. Rabin in 1974, the complexity of the
elementary theory of the field of real numbers is at least exponential and
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therefore implementing the decision procedure for that theory is (at least for
the present) out of the reach of human beings.
I would like to cite some further historical information as evidence of
Tarski’s early interest in completeness and decidability. But let me point
out, first, that his interest in undecidability results came later, at any rate
after Church’s Thesis and Turing’s analysis of computability in 1936. And
the final shift from completeness to decidability came explicitly to light with
the modified version of [Tarski, 1939/1967], prepared by McKinsey as a
Rand Corporation report and published in 1948 under the new title A deci-
sion method for elementary algebra and geometry ([Tarski, 1948]11). In the
foreword of [Tarski, 1939/1967], dated November 1966, Tarski wrote: “A
comparison of the titles of the two monographs reveals that the center of
scientific interest has been shifted to the decision problem from that of com-
pleteness.” The shift happened when Tarski became aware that “the precise
instrument for treating the decision problem is Go¨del-Herbrand notion of
a general recursive function” ((B1),〈5〉), i.e., I assume, already in the late
1930s. (I shall try to confirm this impression below.)
3.1.1. Some historical facts.
(a) In the years 1926–1928, Tarski conducted a seminar atWarsawUniver-
sity on the method of effective quantifier elimination (EEQ).12 This method
was used sketchily by Lo¨wenheim in 1915 and in a developed formby Skolem
in 1919 and by Langford in 1927. Skolem had in this way obtained a decision
method for monadic second-order logic. Langford showed the completeness
of the elementary theory of dense linear orders without first or last elements
and also of the elementary theory of discrete orders with a first but no last
element (for a closer analysis see [Doner and Hodges, 1988]). As stated by
Robert Vaught in [Vaught, 1974, pp. 159–160], Tarski’s work on EEQ led
to various extensions: for instance, Langford’s result for the theory of dis-
crete orders with a first but no last element was extended to the whole class
of discrete orders. This work led also to new results, such as Presburger’s
completeness result for the elementary theory of (N,+,=) in [Presburger,
1930] and Tarski’s famous completeness proof and decision method for el-
ementary algebra — that is for (R,+, ·,=,≥) — and geometry. The latter
result was already announced in Tarski’s paper on definable sets of real num-
bers [Tarski, 1931]; its original proof was given in [Tarski, 1939/1967]. As
mentioned above, Tarski emphasized there that his proof actually gives a
decision procedure and in his Footnote 11 he argued that “it is possible to
defend the standpoint that in all cases in which a theory is tested with respect
to its completeness the essence of the problem is not in the mere proof of
completeness but in giving a decision procedure (or in the demonstration
that it is impossible to give such a procedure)”.13
(b) Tarski attended theKo¨nigsberg meeting in 1930, in whichGo¨del spoke
on his incompleteness result for the first time. Since then, his attention
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very likely remained focused on decidability/undecidability problems, even
if he was led on his own part, and independently, to decision procedures
through the method of effective quantifier elimination he used since 1926–
1928. For instance, Tarski was developing his concept of an essentially
undecidable theory in the late 1930s, which was to be defined precisely
in [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953]. Indeed, in the preface of
the latter, Tarski wrote: “The work contains results obtained over a long
period of time, 1938–1952.” And in the first paper written by Tarski alone,
Footnote 1, p. 3, stresses that “The observations contained in this paper were
made in 1938–1939; they were presented by the author to a meeting of the
Association for Symbolic Logic in 1948, and were summarized in [Tarski,
1949a]”.
(c) In the fall of 1939, Tarski used the opportunity of an invitation from
Columbia University, to talk on the decision problem and its relation to
Go¨del’s incompleteness result. Leon Henkin, who was then an undergradu-
ate student at Columbia, listened to this lecture. Moreover, Tarski published
in 1939 a paper “On undecidable statements in enlarged systems of logic and
the concept of truth” ([Tarski, 1939]), giving “an example of a result ob-
tained by a fruitful combination of the method of constructing undecidable
statements (due to Go¨del) with the results obtained in the theory of truth”.
(d) Tarski obtained a permanent position at Berkeley in 1942. In the sum-
mer of 1943, he gave a seminar on Go¨del’s results there, attended, among
others, by Julia Robinson.14 Tarski continued to deal with the decision prob-
lem applied to various special theories, either himself or through his students,
especially in relation to algebraic systems. In the schedule of courses and
seminars of the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley,15 from 1943–44
through 1947–48, Tarski was listed as holding a seminar largely based on
unpublished work dealing with “Topics in algebra and metamathematics”.
Besides his own work, Tarski referred there to results obtained by some of
his students, such as the undecidability of the elementary theory of the field
of rational numbers proved by Julia Robinson in her dissertation at Berke-
ley (1947) and the decidability of the elementary theory of Abelian groups
proved byWanda Szmielew in the 1940s. Tarski very likely suggested the de-
cision problem for Abelian groups to Szmielew before leaving Poland in 1939
(see Note 19 below); this fact and Footnote 1 to the first paper of [Tarski,
Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953] lead to the conclusion that the shift from
completeness to decidability was beginning before 1940, even though it came
to a crucial point only in the beginning of 1948, when the Rand Corporation
offered to publish Tarski’s results on the decision method for elementary
algebra and geometry [Tarski, 1948]. In his Preface to the 1951 reprint of
the Rand Corporation report, Tarski makes clear that he has brought to the
fore “the possibility of constructing an actual decision machine” in response
to the interests of the Rand Corporation.
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3.1.2. Unpublished results in 1946. The antepenultimate paragraphof (B1)
— no 21 according to my numbering — mentions some results, still unpub-
lished in 1946; the introduction and Footnotes 2 and 3 of [Tarski, 1948]16
allow us to attribute and partly to date these results. Tarski proved that
there is neither a decision procedure for the elementary theory of groups
nor for the elementary theory of lattices. According to Footnote 1, page 77
of [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953], Tarski stated the undecidabil-
ity for the elementary theory of groups in his Princeton talk, which likely
means that he had found the result before this talk and stated it there for
the first time (for a bigger audience than at his seminar at Berkeley). Later
on, the result appeared in print in an abstract of The Journal of Symbolic
Logic [Tarski, 1949b]. As for the undecidability of the elementary theory of
lattices, it certainly had been found before the Princeton talk, but the first
publicationmentioning it is an abstract published in 1949 [Tarski, 1949c] and
referred to in [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953, p. 33, l. -4 and Foot-
note 24]. Other interesting examples of undecidable elementary theories are
given in [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953, pp. 33 and 67–71 (Corol-
lary 13)]. Among other positive results, Tarski found a decision method for
the elementary theory of Boolean algebras in 1940. In collaboration with
Andrzej Mostowski, he developed the outline of a proof of the decidability
of the elementary theory of well-orderings in the late 1930s;17 the proof itself
came in 1941.18 As noted above, his student Wanda Szmielew proved the
decidability of the elementary theory of Abelian groups,19 and McKinsey
did likewise for the class of true universal sentences of elementary lattice
theory in 1943.
3.2. Unsolved cases of the decision problem. In fact, dealing precisely with
decidability and especially with undecidability requires the Herbrand-Go¨del
concept of general recursive functions—our recursive functions—, asTarski
stressed in the beginning of 〈5〉 in (B1). Indeed, a theoryT is decidable if the
characteristic function of the set Σ of theorems of T is recursive, undecidable
if the characteristic function of Σ is not recursive. Tarski recalls that in the
last sentence of (B1), 〈8〉. In [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953, p. 14]
Tarski will state the following definition, which is now completely standard:
“A theory T is decidable if the set of all its valid sentences is recursive, and
otherwise undecidable.”
3.2.1. Hilbert’s tenth problem. Among several unsolved problems the first
to be mentioned in (B1) is Hilbert’s tenth problem: the problem of decid-
ing for an arbitrary Diophantine equation whether or not it has a solution
in integers. Tarski mentions this problem twice in (B1), first in 〈4〉, then
in 〈16〉, where the following is stated about that problem: “instead of single
statements perhaps simple classes of theorems [statements] can be shown
undecidable”. Actually, it was one of the most famous problems Tarski
spoke about to his colleagues and students. Julia Robinson wrote her Ph.D.
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thesis giving a negative solution of the decision problem for the elementary
theory of rational numbers in 1947. The problem was suggested to her by
Tarski, through her husband, Raphael M. Robinson, who was a professor
at Berkeley. (Raphael M. Robinson spent the academic year 1946–1947
at Princeton, attended the Bicentennial Conference with Julia and was in
close contact with Tarski at Berkeley.) Following Tarski’s guidelines, Julia
Robinson showed the undecidability of the elementary theory of rational
numbers and, more generally, that of fields, by showing the definability of
integers within the field of rationals [Robinson, 1949a], [Robinson, 1949b].
This is a method to which Tarski would give a general and formal setting
in [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953]. In 1948, Julia Robinson began
to struggle with Hilbert’s tenth problem itself. The first decisive step towards
the — negative — solution was to be made only in 1961 in a joint paper
by Julia Robinson, Martin Davis, and Hilary Putnam [Davis, Putnam, and
Robinson, 1961]. In January 1970, stimulated by a new paper of Julia Robin-
son [Robinson, 1969], Yuri Matijasevich proved that there is no algorithm
that can determine of a givenDiophantine equation whether it has a solution
in natural numbers.20
3.2.2. Formally independent propositions involving integers. Another task
(B1) proposed to mathematicians has a different nature, although it focuses
too on the elementary theory of arithmetic: constructing an undecidable
proposition involving integers which one could come across “in the course
of any ordinary mathematical work” (〈15〉). First of all, let us stress that up
to now “undecidable” was used, in Tarski’s Princeton talk, with reference
to theories with an unsolvable decision problem; the task proposed now
implies a different meaning of the word, referring to individual statements
that are neither provable nor refutable in some given formalism, i.e., to
independent statements of the given formalism. If there is one statement
F of some formalism Φ so that F is neither provable nor refutable in Φ,
then Φ is incomplete. The formalism Φ is “essentially incomplete if it is
impossible to add a finite or infinite recursive set of axioms which completes
it” (〈9〉). It must be noted here that recursivity enabled Tarski to define the
notion of essential incompleteness. Such a definition was already sketched
in [Tarski, 1939/1967, Footnote 37] referring to Go¨del’s monograph of 1931
and to [Rosser, 1936].
Now, the elementary theory of arithmetic is essentially incomplete, but
Go¨del’s independent statement is not exactly of the kind pleasing to “the
general mathematician”. If one could reach Tarski’s proposed goal of con-
structing an “ordinary”21 independent arithmetical proposition, then “or-
dinary” mathematicians could no longer believe that logicians construct
undecidable propositions merely for the sake of their undecidability. This is
a recurrent theme of Tarski’s, in that he always kept in mind daily mathe-
matical practice, and made a great many efforts to give his reasoning and his
TARSKI’S ADDRESS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY BICENTENNIAL CONFERENCE . . . 13
results a mathematical form rather than a metamathematical one. Despite
what is conceded on the differentiation between logic andmathematics at the
beginning of (B1), 〈2〉, Tarski was very eager to destroy the border Hilbert
had put up between mathematics and metamathematics22 and wanted to
afford evidence that mathematical logic could help solve ordinary mathe-
matical problems. It was in this spirit that Tarski first published the paper
on definable sets of real numbers [Tarski, 1931] containing results of interest
to “the general mathematician”.23 And only later he published his paper
on the decision method for real algebra, that led to the results of the earlier
paper. However this method, based on effective elimination of quantifiers
(EEQ) for the elementary theory of the real numbers, is a generalization of
a mathematical theorem, Sturm’s algorithm for counting the real roots of
polynomial equations.24 Thus, it is difficult to separate the (logical) method
and its (mathematical) content and consequences, and we can agree with
Henkin25 who thinks that Tarski “considered his most important contri-
bution to mathematics up to 1946”, to have been this decision method for
real algebra. In accord with the last sentences of (B1), in the account of
the final session of the Princeton Conference, the reporter has noted the
“insistent pressing [of mathematical logic] on toward the problems of the
general mathematician”. Certainly, this “insistent pressing” was Tarski’s
hallmark more than that of any other logician present at the Princeton logic
session.26 As is known, Paris and Harrington [Paris and Harrington, 1977]
have constructed a first-order arithmetic proposition, more “natural” than
Go¨del’s proposition, which they proved neither provable nor refutable in
Peano Arithmetic (PA). However, it still seems today that propositions like
this do not occur often in mathematical practice.
3.2.3. Absolutely unsolvable arithmetic propositions.Athirdquestionasked
by (B1) about arithmetic propositions was whether there are arithmetic
propositions which are absolutely undecidable (〈17〉, Question 2) or, let us
better say, absolutely unsolvable, the search being for propositions that “are
neither provable nor disprovable in any member of a hierarchy of systems
constructed on the original systems in which the [given] proposition is un-
decidable”. In his letter to Go¨del dated December 10, 1946 (published
in [Wolen´ski and Ko¨hler, 1999, pp. 271–272]), Tarski says:
“As regards the question in which you are interested [absolute prov-
ability, definability, etc.], I don’t think that I can do anything else [in
the Princeton Bicentennial talk] but to emphasize the fundamental
difference between all the undecidable statements known at present
in elementary number theory on the one hand and some undecidable
statements (like continuum hypothesis) in analysis and set theory;
the statements of the first kind being clearly undecidable in a rela-
tive sense while those of the second seem to be undecidable in some
absolute sense. And in this connection I shall raise the problems
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(1) whether and how the notions of relative and absolute undecid-
ability can be made precise and (2) whether, on the basis of some
adequate definition of these notions, it will be possible to show that
a number-theoretical problem can be undecidable only in a relative
sense. Perhaps I shall make some additional remarks emphasizing
the difficulty of these problems; and, of course, since now I know
what you are planning to discuss,27 I shall refer to your subsequent
remarks.”
The answer to the Question 2 is positive in some cases, negative in others,
depending not only on the nature of the extension principle adopted but
also on which paths through the Church-Kleene constructive ordinals are
allowed.
3.3. Undecidable problems in analysis and set theory. The largest part
of (B1) is devoted to the decision problems for number-theoretical proposi-
tions, even if account is taken of their geometric interpretation and the link
with recursive functions is stressed. Indeed, it is only with Paragraph 〈18〉
that Tarski turns to questions in other mathematical domains. The first
problem proposed in 〈18〉 is whether the elementary theory Rexp of the
real numbers with addition, multiplication, and exponentiation is decid-
able. First, let us note that Tarski puts the question of the decidability of
Rexp in analysis and set theory, whereas the completeness and decidability
of the elementary theory of the ordered field (R, 0, 1,+, ·,=,≥) was proved
within a framework excluding “the sophisticated machinery of set theory”
and the general concept of whole number. The method of proof was Sturm’s
theorem whose mathematical content is purely algebraic as Tarski stressed
(see [Tarski, 1939/1967, pp. 315, 332]). The “elementary algebra” — as
Tarski wrote28 — ofR and the elementary theory of complete ordered fields
as well are decidable. The answer to the question asked here forRexp remains
open today, but important progress has been made. First, making essential
use of results from analysis, Alex Wilkie proved that Rexp does not admit
elimination of quantifiers but that it is model complete, i.e., that for every
formula of Rexp one can find an equivalent existential formula.29 Then,
in [Macintyre and Wilkie, 1996] it is proved that this theory is decidable
under a strong hypothesis, namely that Schanuel’s conjecture for the real
numbers is true — a conjecture that is generally thought to be plausible but
out of reach at present.
The second outstanding problem briefly mentioned in 〈18〉 is the well-
known continuum hypothesis (CH). Go¨del proved in 1937 the relative con-
sistency of CH with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice
(ZFC). The passage of his letter to Go¨del, quoted above in 3.2.3, gives
evidence that Tarski conjectured the independence of CH from ZFC. As
it is well-known, Paul Cohen confirmed this conjecture in 1963. In 〈19〉
Tarski conjectured also the “absolute unsolvability” of Suslin’s problem and
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this conjecture was confirmed too twenty-five years later in a joint work
by Robert Solovay and S. Tennenbaum [Solovay and Tennenbaum, 1971].
Suslin’s problem was the following: Is an order complete, order dense lin-
early ordered set without first or last element and in which every family of
disjoint open intervals is countable necessarily isomorphic to the real line?
Assuming the consistency of ZFC, this problem was proved independent of
ZFC.
3.4. The notion of elementary equivalence. As stated by [Vaught, 1974],
Tarski’s work on EEQ was going in another direction than finding decision
procedures. It led indeed to the general study of the notions of elemen-
tary equivalence, elementary classes, and elementary extensions. From the
beginning to the end of his career, Tarski was deeply interested in these
notions and especially in finding the complete elementary extensions of a
theory. The notion of elementary equivalence — or, equivalently “arith-
metical equivalence”, which is the expression used in (B1) — appeared in
print for the first time in the appendix to [Tarski, 1936]. There, Tarski
classified dense orders up to elementary equivalence and stated that only
four such elementary nonequivalent order types exist. He concluded that “it
seems that a new, wide realm of investigation is here opened up. It is perhaps
of interest that these investigations can be carried out within the framework
of mathematics itself (e.g., set theory) and that the concepts and methods
of metamathematics are essentially superfluous.” In the conclusion of (B1)
further study of the notion of arithmetical equivalence is suggested, and the
construction of a theory of elementary equivalence of algebras “as deep as
the notions of isomorphism, etc. now in use” is proposed (〈22〉). Maybe
the warmest tribute paid to this suggestion is Nathan Jacobson’s treatise on
Basic Algebra (published in the 1970s), in which a large space is devoted
to model-theoretic algebra, i.e., essentially to the application of the logical
relation of elementary equivalence to algebraic structures.
It is, of course, a corollary to Lo¨wenheim’s theorem (see [Lo¨wenheim,
1915]) that two nonisomorphic structures can be elementarily equivalent,
i.e., indistinguishable from the point of view of first-order logic. For ex-
ample, the structure consisting of just any countably infinite set (without
any relations, operations, or distinguished individuals) is a model of the
(complete) elementary theory of the structure consisting of just the set of
the real numbers and is thus elementarily equivalent (but not of course iso-
morphic) to that structure. Tarski found (and stated in [Tarski, 1939/1967,
comments on Corollary 2.13, pp. 324–325] a deeper and more interesting
example of nonisomorphic, elementary equivalent structures, namely the
field of real numbers and the (countable) field of real agebraic numbers. In
the appendix to [Tarski, 1936], Tarski defined the notions of “arithmetical
class” and “elementary equivalence”. In [Tarski, 1952] he gave an outline of
the general theory of arithmetical classes. A few years later he elaborated,
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in collaboration with Robert Vaught, the fundamental notion of elementary
extension [Tarski and Vaught, 1957].
Conclusion. I have started these comments with a rough comparison with
Hilbert’s 1900 address. I must conclude now by stressing some differences
between Hilbert’s address and Tarski’s one. First, Tarski develops very
briefly his views on what is a problem and how to define mathematical logic
(Paragraphs 〈1〉 and 〈2〉). In contrast, Hilbert gives amuchmore substantive
account of the nature and the growth of mathematics, of the significance
of some problems for various mathematical domains, of the necessity of
(logical) rigor in mathematical proofs (understood as finite procedures), of
the simplicity introduced by more general axiomatic foundations, of the
fruitful interplay between problems or methods arising from different areas
of mathematics which, then, show profound analogies with each other, etc.
Secondly, I have to recall that Tarski’s talk is not a paper written and revised
by its author; hence some formulations are not as precise as they could and
should have been.
Nevertheless, as it is, the transcript of Tarski’s talk (B1), along with the
summary (A) and the transcript of the general discussion (B2), is instruc-
tive, because it seems to have been done in the middle of Tarski’s work on
undecidability. Decidability/undecidability was indeed a chief theme for
a long period whose crucial point seems to have been around 1946–1948
and which was crowned by the booklet Undecidable Theories published in
1953. Actually, it is natural to think that (B1) is certainly the remaining
record of an intermediate stage of Tarski’s work on elaborating the no-
tion of essential undecidability. Let us note that, in fact, (B1) used and
defined “essential incompleteness” and not “essential undecidability”, but
naturally the latter notion is present through Rosser’s result on the essential
undecidability of PA which is referred to. According to Tarski’s preface
of [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953], his two contributed papers to
this book cover work during the period 1938–1952, the results of the first
paper being summarized in [Tarski, 1949a] and referred to in [Robinson,
1949b].30
The document (B1) is also interesting because it explicitly proposes the
task of constructing a theory of elementary equivalence, which certainly
was the pivot of the by-then already flourishing but still unnamed model
theory. According to Footnote 18 of [Tarski, 1952], Tarski mentioned in his
Princeton talk some applications of the theory of elementarily equivalent
classes of algebraic systems. Tarski wrote in his Footnote 18 that he had, in
1946, explicitly pointed out the general method of proving the existence of
algebraic structures with some properties prescribed in advance, for instance
the existence of non-Archimedean ordered fields. It must be noted that
(B1) kept no record of that mention.
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Finally, (B1) alludes to some epistemological views on mathematics and
logic. Everybody who knew Tarski knows that he always tried to move at-
tention to metamathematical problems that he could solve without invoking
any philosophical position. That does not mean that he had no views at all
on how to understand “doing mathematics or logic” or “solving a problem”.
Let us close by some remarks on this issue.
First, Tarski stresses in Paragraph 〈1〉 of his talk that he will not consider
that solving a problem affords a clue as to the question of being such-
and-such for some mathematical object. More pragmatically, by solving a
problem he means the task of constructing “something with such-and-such
properties” or, more generally, constructing a mathematical theory which
makes clear such-and-such properties of some mathematical entity (object
or process). Tarski’s “constructionism” — if I may use a neologism —
is asserted here from a pragmatic point of view and not for philosophical
or epistemological reasons, “pragmatic” being understood by reference to
(mathematical vs. logical) practice. It is in such a pragmatic way that Tarski
used the term “logic” as denoting by definition the work of people who re-
gard themselves as logicians or are considered logicians by mathematicians.
Thus, Paragraphs 〈1〉 and 〈2〉 of this talk confirm Tarski’s pragmatic point
of view, referring to none of the three great trends in philosophy of math-
ematics and logic dominant at the beginning of our century: logicism of
Russell, formalism of Hilbert’s program, and intuitionism of Brouwer and
being quite different from Go¨del’s “platonism”. Tarski once characterized
his attitude towards the foundations of mathematics as an “intuitionistic for-
malism”, referring to Lesniewski. It was in 1930, in the last paragraph of the
introduction to his Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven
Wissenschaften.31 But when the paper was translated by J. H. Woodger into
English in 1956, Tarski added a footnote saying that this characterization no
longer reflected his present attittude. However, he did not characterize his
new attitude positively in this footnote. Later, in a lecture given in 1966 and
edited twenty years later by John Corcoran [Tarski, 1986b, p. 145], address-
ing the question “What are logical notions?”, Tarski stressed how much his
approach stood away from attempts to “catch the proper, true meaning of
a notion, something independent of actual usage, and independent of any
normative proposals, something like the platonic idea behind the notion”.
He added that, for his part, he would make “a suggestion or proposal about
a possible use of the term ‘logical notion’ ”. Although Tarski did not himself
use the term “pragmatism”, this term seems to me the most appropriate in
the case of what is said in the quoted passage and in (B1) as well. Actually,
this may be in conflict with the belief Tarski expressed another time, when
he said that “he, perhaps in a «future incarnation», would be able to accept
a sort of moderate platonism” (quoted in [Wolen´ski, 1995, p. 336], with
reference to the typescript of Tarski’s contribution to a meeting, in 1965, on
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the significance of Go¨del’s theorem). But this quotation itself is in sharp
conflict with a passage quoted by Solomon Feferman in one of his recently
published papers ([Feferman, 1999, p. 61]). This passage is an excerpt from
“taped and transcribed (but unpublished) extemporaneous remarks from
an Association of Symbolic Logic symposium in 1965” (the same year as
for the typescript referred to by Wolen´ski). In this excerpt Tarski described
himself as an «extreme anti-Platonist» and says “However, I represent this
very crude, naive kind of anti-Platonism, one thing I could describe as mate-
rialism, or nominalism with some materialistic taint”. This description does
not contradict the pragmatistic attitude of (B1).
Secondly and as a consequence of his pragmatistic attitude, Tarski stressed
here, as in some other writings, the practical (mathematical) efficiency of
logic and expressed the hope that “the general mathematician” (〈15〉) will
“appreciate the work of logicians more than they do at present” (〈23〉).
Thanks to a great deal of effort expanded not only by Tarski himself but
also by many other outstanding logicians, the prestige of logicians among
mathematicians has much increased since 1946. Nevertheless, the hope that
such a prestige would keep on increasing is still justified.
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(A)
A summary of the address to be given by Alfred Tarski
at the conference on the problems of mathematics
in Princeton, December 17, 1946.1
1. The discussion of some outstanding problems in mathematical logic as
the main task of the talk. Some explanations regarding the way in which
the terms “problem” and “mathematical logic” are used. Among problems
discussed are both definite questions of the form “Is it so and so?” as well
as problems of a more general and less determined nature, which could be
more properly characterized as tasks. The term “mathematical logic” is
used rather in a pragmatic sense intented to cover the work actually done
by mathematical logicians. In consequence, most of the problems discussed
belong to the domain of metalogic and metamathematics, and not to that of
logic in a stricter sense.
2. The impossibility of discussing all important problems of mathematical
logic in the present talk. The decision to disregard problems whose main
importance seems to lie in their implications for such domains as epistemol-
ogy or the methodology of empirical sciences. The choice of the decision
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problem, with its various ramifications and connections, as the focal point
of the address. A justification of this choice from historical, material, and
heuristic points of view.
3. The notion of general recursiveness as a precise instrument for the study
of the decision problem; its intrinsic significance. The importance of a more
penetrating study of this notion. The task of constructing a “mathematical”
theory of general recursive sets of integers (and general resursive relations
between integers). Some suggestions for attacking this problem. Analogies
between known facts about general recursive sets of integers on the one
hand, and Borelian and projective sets of real numbers on the other. A
classification of sets of integers analogous to that of projective sets; the
problem of the place of general recursive sets in this classification.
4. The formulation of the logical decision problem in terms of general
recursiveness: Is the class S of all provable statements in a given formalized
system general recursive? The connection between this problem and that
of completeness of a given formalized system; the notion of the essential
incompleteness of a system. Decision problem as applied to subclasses of S
or to other classes of formulas. The question of intuitive adequacy of the
notion of general recursiveness for the formulation of the decision problem.
5. The decision problems applying to elementary parts of logic — sen-
tential calculus and predicate calculus. Examples of some problems in this
domain which remain open; is there a procedure to decide whether a given
(finite) system of formulas of sentential calculus constitutes an adequate
axiom system for this calculus?
6. The non-classical systems of mathematical logic and their intuitive con-
nection with the decision problem. “Many valued” systems of sentential
calculus; specific decision problems regarding such systems. The problem of
extending non-classical systems of logic beyond sentential calculus.
7. Decision problem in number theory. The insufficiency of the results so
far obtained from the viewpoint of mathematicians. The question of solv-
ability of individual number-theoretical problems. Open decision problems
for special important classes of number-theoretical theorems;2 is the class of
solvable Diophantine equations with constant coefficients general recursive?
The “relative” character of insolvability of number-theoretical problems; the
question of the existence of problems which are insolvable in an “absolute”
sense.
8. Decision problems in analysis and general set theory. Emphasis on the
application of the problem to individual statements (in view of the negative
character of general results). Examples of unsolved set-theoretical problems
where help on the part of mathematical logic can reasonably be expected.
Problems of the foundations of set theory connected with the decision prob-
lem.
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9. Decision problems for various abstract algebraic systems. A short sur-
vey of known results and open decision problems. Problem of the actual
construction of “decision machines” for these systems for which the decision
problem has been affirmatively solved. Methods of attacking open decision
problems. Problems and notions which result from the study of the decision
problem for algebraic systems. The notions of an arithmetical property (an
elementary definable property) of an algebraic systemand of the arithmetical
equivalence of two such systems; related problems.
10. Consistency problem and its connection with the decision problem.
The results of Go¨del and Gentzen and their intuitive value; the question of a
precise characterization of the notion of a finitary proof. Possible extensions
of Gentzen’s result.
11. Concluding remarks on the present stage of logical research and its
importance for mathematics.
(B1)
Talk by prof. Tarski at the logic conference,
December 1946, Princeton.3
〈1〉 The title and general character of the Princeton mathematical bicen-
tennial conference suggests that the session devoted to mathematical logic
should address itself to some outstanding problem or problems in math-
ematical logic. Now the word “problem” has two distinct senses: in one
sense, a problem is a definite question like “Is such-and-such the case[?]”; in
another sense, we mean by a problem something of a less determined nature
— which could perhaps more properly be characterized as a task — such as
“Construct something with such-and-such properties”. It is in this second
— more general, if you prefer — sense that I shall call the attention of this
assembly to some important unsolved problems in mathematical logic.
〈2〉 I give the term “logic” here no precise definition. I use the word prag-
matically to denote the work of people who regard themselves as logicians
— or those who are considered logicians by mathematicians generally. We
agree to differentiate between logic and mathematics on the one hand and
metalogic and metamathematics on the other. And we immediately note
in connection with our pragmatic definition of logic that the chief concern
of logicians today is with metalogic and metamathematics rather than with
specific deductive principles.4
〈3〉 Now it would of course be impossible to speak of all the current
problems of mathematical logic in the present talk. Therefore we are going
to omit problems, such as those concerning confirmation and modality,
whose main importance seems to lie in their implications for such domains
as epistemology or the methodology of the empirical sciences. Furthermore,
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limitation of time determines that the conference shall concern itself with
one important problem: I have taken the decision problem.
〈4〉 The choice of this important topic can be justified on several grounds.
From a historical point of view we note that Hilbert considered the main
task of logic to be the construction of a symbolism for use in solving the
general decision problem. This was the raison d’eˆtre of metamathematics.
In 1900 in his Paris address Hilbert formulated the problem of deciding for
an arbitrary Diophantine equation whether it has a solution in integers — a
problem which still remains unsolved.5 Materially, we can justify the choice
of the decision problem on the grounds that the task of logic is to mechanize
thinking.6 Heuristically, the choice can be justified by the fact that many
diverse questions can be couched in terms of, and brought to a focus by, this
problem.
〈5〉 Now it appears that the precise instrument for treating the decision
problem is the Go¨del-Herbrand notion of a general recursive function. The
notion of general recursive function, as well as of general recursive set,7 is
a worthwhile idea in itself and, apart from its purely logical applications,
certainly deserves to be studied more closely from a strictly mathematical
point of view. Without defining “general recursive set” precisely, we may say
that a set is general recursive if one can always determine in a finite number
of steps whether an arbitrary given element belongs to it. Such sets were
considered by Kronecker.8
〈6〉With regard to the task of constructing a “mathematical” theory of
general recursive sets of integers and general recursive relations between in-
tegers we may compare general recursive sets of integers on the one hand
and the Borelian and projective sets of real numbers studied by Luzin on the
other. There are analogies between these two theories, inmethods as well [as]
in results.9 We note that performing certain operations on general recursive
sets, such as taking [finite] unions, [finite] intersections, or complements, will
yield new recursive sets. This is not true, however, of all operations which
one may perform on general recursive sets — a simple example being given
by the operation of “projection”, which corresponds to the logical operation
of quantification.10 The situation becomes geometrically clear if we regard
a general recursive set of integers as represented by a set in n-dimensional
space. If the propositional function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) defines such a recur-
sive set, the propositional function (Ex1)f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) defines merely a
recursively enumerable set, the complement of which need not be recursively
enumerable, and which may be regarded as the projection of the original set
onto an (n − 1)-dimensional subspace. We are confronted with a similar
situation in the case of Borelian sets.11
〈7〉We find other interesting problems arising out of this analogy. We
know, for instance, that for any two disjoint analytic sets there exist disjoint
Borelian sets containing the given sets. We should like to know if, similarly,
24 TARSKI’S ADDRESS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY BICENTENNIAL CONFERENCE . . .
one can be certain there exist disjoint recursive sets containing any given pair
of disjoint recursively enumerable sets.12 Again, in connection with the com-
parison of Borelian sets with recursive sets,13 we note that Borelian sets are
classified by rank as they are built up from simple sets by complementation
and kindred operations. In the classification of recursive sets what should
be taken as simple sets of integers? For this second problem I have a definite
suggestion as to a process that should be attempted. It seems advisable to
me to start with sets of integers satisfying certain Diophantine equations:
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0.14 It seems obvious that several operations on this
class will yield general recursive sets. It further seems plausible that all gen-
eral recursive sets can be obtained in this way.15 Moreover I believe, this way
of working with recursive sets is the procedure best adapted to the solution
of special problems. One possibility of procedure would be to construct an
abstract theory of projective sets to include Luzin-theory and the theory of
general recursive sets as two cases.16
〈8〉We now apply the notion of general recursive sets to a formulation of
the logical decision problem. In an intuitive way the solution of the decision
problem means determining whether there exists a mechanical means of
deciding whether any given statement of a formal system is a theorem. More
precisely it means determining whether the set of provable statements of a
formal system is general recursive.
〈9〉 The term “formal system” as I am using it here is, of course, defined
in the ordinary way: we take for granted a list of symbols, a selection of
certain sequences of symbols from the set of all finite sequences to be called
“formulas”, the selection of a subset of the formulas called “axioms”, and
of rules whereby formulas can be deduced from the axioms, such formulas
being called “theorems”.17 The term “completeness”, as I shall use it, will
also have the usual definition. With negation either a primitive or defined
symbol of the formal system, by completeness we mean simply that, given
any formula [without free variables], either that formula or its negation
is a theorem. Since the theorems of any formal system are recursively
enumerable we note that any system which is complete is recursive — but of
course not conversely.18 With respect to any incomplete system the question
immediately arises whether we can add axioms to complete the system. We
shall call a system “essentially incomplete” if it is impossible to add a finite
or infinite recursive set of axioms which completes it. Go¨del’s work shows
the existence of essentially incomplete systems.
〈10〉 I should mention the fact that some logicians have felt that the notion
of general recursiveness may not in actuality be adequate to handle the
intuitive content of the decision problem. While I do not deny these men the
right to doubt such adequacy I feel that they have the obligation to offer a
substitute for general recursiveness if they expect to halt the work along lines
based on the notion of general recursiveness. But regarding such adequacy
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of general recursiveness more will be said by another speaker19 later this
evening, and therefore I shall refrain from further remarks on the subject.
〈11〉 Now let us examine the decision problem in some elementary forms
of logic. First, the sentential calculus: for this there is the positive result
based on the two-valued truth-table method. I do not know who actually is
the author of this procedure — whether it was Frege or Peirce — but what
is important is that we do have this now classical result.20 For the monadic
functional calculus it is well known that the result is positive.21 It is negative,
however, for the general case of the predicate calculus.22
〈12〉With respect to these elementary systems there are still many unsolved
problems. There is, for example, the question of finding a procedure to tell
whether a given set of formulas is adequate as a set of axioms for the sentential
calculus. This is a decision question of a new sort, which does not concern
itself merely with the formal theorems of a system.23
〈13〉 Historically the decision problem has had a direct bearing on the
origin of many-valued systems of logic. At one time it seems that logicians
in general felt that the solution of the decision problem for the classical
two-valued logic was too difficult to attack directly and that the problem
should be attempted piecemeal, that is by first solving the decision problem
for various subsystems of the classical calculus. It was in this way that the
multi-valued systems were created:24 for they are in most cases just that —
subsystems of the classical calculus — though this remark does not apply to
the Lewis systems.25 Some of the decision problems associated with these
systems have been solved.26
〈14〉 In passing from this topic — and I hope that no creators of many-
valued logics are present, so that I may speak freely — I should say that the
only one of these systems for which there is any hope of survival is that of
Birkhoff and von Neumann.27 This system will survive because it does fulfil
a real need.28 Here we note that the decision problem is still open.29
〈15〉 Let us now consider the decision problem in relation to number the-
ory. Number theory is incomplete — and indeed, essentially incomplete.
I wish to say a word, however, about the type of undecidable propositions
which have been constructed by logicians in number theory. None of these
problems is exactly pleasing to the generalmathematician; it would be a great
stride forward in placating the mathematician if we could actually construct
such an undecidable proposition involving integers. After all, the mathe-
matician believes that these propositions have been constructed for the sake
of their undecidability, and he has great difficulty convincing himself that he
will ever address himself to such a sentence in the course of any ordinary
mathematical work. For proving a “simple” arithmetic proposition unde-
cidable, the methods used heretofore certainly seem inadequate. It would
also prove a great advance— and one which again I might say would greatly
increase the prestige of logicians amongmathematicians— if we could prove
26 TARSKI’S ADDRESS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY BICENTENNIAL CONFERENCE . . .
certain questions not general recursive. And as Dr. Go¨del has given me per-
mission to refer to his unpublished works30 I may say that we are extremely
close to the culmination of such an enterprise.
〈16〉 As another plan of attack I wish to suggest that instead of single
statements perhaps simple classes of theorems31 can be shown undecidable
—such [a] procedure being suggestedby theproblemwhichHilbert advanced
in 1900 on Diophantine equations.
〈17〉 Perhaps the question of number-theoretic undecidable propositions
will be better understood if we appreciate the relative character of this un-
solvability. With respect to the known examples of unsolvable propositions
the proof of unsolvability gives an intuitive proof of the truth (or the falsity)
of the theorem, and leads to a natural extension of the original system in
which the theorem becomes decidable. But we are faced here with two very
important problems: (1) how can we make precise this notion of natural
extension;32 and (2) are there propositions of a number-theoretic nature
which are undecidable in an absolute sense, that is, are neither provable nor
disprovable in any member of a hierarchy of systems constructed on the
original systems in which the proposition is undecidable? 33
〈18〉 Questions regarding the decision problem for analysis and set theory
are far more complicated than the corresponding questions for number
theory, since the former contain arithmetic as a subdomain. Of course
it is well known that the general decision problem for analysis and set theory
has been answered in the negative.34 But important problems [which are]
not yet worked out exist for special classes of statements; for example, to
decide whether a given statement is provable from or independent of certain
axioms. The class of statements about the domain of real numbers which
can be stated using only addition and multiplication has a general decision
procedure; the existence of such a general decision procedure is equivalent to
the solution of the decision problem for (elementary) analytic geometry.35
As soon as we generalize slightly, however, and ask ourselves what is the
situation when we allow also the operation of exponentiation, for instance,
little or nothing is known.36 And lastly, as a source of a wealth of labor
for future logicians interested in decision-problem questions for analysis, we
should mention the results of Go¨del on the continuum hypothesis — too
well-known to require elaboration in the brief time we have at our disposal.
〈19〉 In discussing the relations between set theory itself and logic I shall
begin by saying that I believe that the set-theorist may expect much from the
formal logician. I believe that certain problems of set theory may actually
be independent of the axioms of set theory and may be shown to be so
independent by formal logical means. Suslin’s problem on ordered sets is a
good example of a problemwhichmathematicians have not been able to solve
either positively or negatively, and for which this situation of independence
of the axioms of set theory probably holds.37 I should remark here that with
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regard to set theory the question of a definition of “natural extension” again
arises.38 Here too, such a definition must be agreed upon in order to define
the notion of absolute unsolvability.
〈20〉 Although the question of the decision problem for algebraic systems
is exceedingly interesting tome, because of lack of time, I shall confinemyself
to a few— perhaps superficial — observations. The reason why the decision
problem for algebraic systems is so interesting is precisely this: within any
algebraic system the sets of statements for which we may expect positive
results on the decision problem have intrinsic algebraic significance.
〈21〉 In any modern algebraic treatment of groups, rings, etc. we can dis-
tinguish two complementary classes of statements. The first class deals with
the elements and fundamental operations of some particular algebra; this
class we shall call the arithmetic statements39 of the algebra. The second
class, requiring much of the sophisticated machinery of set theory, deals
with relations between algebras, etc. Now it may be possible to solve the
decision problem for the first of these classes. After all, we do already pos-
sess most important results: we know that the decision problem for general
elementary groups has been answered in the negative40 and for elementary
Abelian groups in the positive;41 moreover we know that for general lattices
the answer is negative,42 but that it is positive for certain special lattices (for
example, for Boolean algebras43).
〈22〉 In closing I should like to suggest further study of arithmetical prop-
erties and arithmetical equivalence of algebras. (These words themselves,
of course, need precise definition.44) In particular I should like to offer the
challenge of two problems: (1) In howmany ways can arithmetic axioms for
Abelian group theory be added to make a complete system?45 (2) Algebras
exist which are not isomorphic, but which cannot be distinguished by their
arithmetic properties; it would be desirable to construct a theory of arith-
metic equivalence of algebras as deep as the notions of isomorphism, etc.
now in use.46
〈23〉 A final word: I might say that one of my aims in this talk was
to show the relations between logic and mathematics. I consider logic a
branch of mathematics, although I freely admit that the part of logic which
is mathematics does not perhaps exhaust logic. Certainly logicians do owe
mathematicians a great debt of gratitude for the wealth of problems they [the
mathematicians] have offered. Conversely, however, it is hoped that under
the plan I have suggested mathematicians generally will appreciate the work
of logicians more than they do at present.
NOTES
1This summary was prepared by Tarski before the Conference (cf. letter from Kleene to
Church of November 29, 1946, quoted in my introduction §1, p. 4).
2Tarski evidently means “statements” (and not “theorems”).
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3As I made clear above (my introduction, §1 and §2, pp. 4–6), the text of this talk was
not written down by Tarski. It was based on notes of L. Henkin and S. C. Kleene, or on a
tape-recording. The title was therefore not given by Tarski.
4Tarski used the Hilbertian word “metamathematics” in a new sense. As he stated in his
Grundzu¨ge des Systemenkalku¨ls ([Tarski, 1935, p. 27]), the task of metamathematics is “to
define the meaning of general metamathematical concepts which appear in the discussion of
the most diverse deductive theories and to establish the basic properties of these concepts”.
And quoting from [Tarski, 1930a]: “Formalized deductive disciplines form the field of
research of metamathematics roughly in the same sense in which spatial entities form the
field of research in geometry” (p. 313). Examples of general metamathematical concepts
include consequence, model, satisfiability, completeness, decidability, etc. Let us recall that
Tarski’s papers reprinted in [Tarski, 1986a] are and will be cited according to the reprints.
5Hilbert’s tenth problem has been negatively solved in 1970 by Yuri Matijasevich, using
earlier work of Martin Davis, Hilary Putnam, and Julia Robinson; more is said about the
history of the solution in my introduction, 3.2.1.
6Should we understand that Tarski had in mind something like Leibniz’s “calculus ratioci-
nator”? In paragraph 〈8〉 below of his talk, Tarski says more explicitly: “The solution of the
decision problem means determining whether there exists amechanical means [my emphasis]
of deciding whether any given statement of a formal system is a theorem.” This is just the
way of speaking when one takes Hilbert’s view on formalization and on what one should be
looking for by constructing formal systems.
7The class of (general) recursive functions (from some finite power of the setN of natural
numbers intoN) is the smallest set which contains all the constant functions, the successor
and the projections, and which is closed under composition, a form of simple definition by
induction (primitive recursion), and minimalization (see, for example, [Moschovakis, 1980,
pp. 5–6]). A set is recursive if its characteristic function is recursive.
8Tarski is probably alluding toKronecker’s famous paper U¨ber denZahlbegriff ([Kronecker,
1887]).
9In the early 1930s Tarski and Kuratowski had emphazised analogies between Luzin’s
projective sets and Tarski’s definable sets of real numbers. In particular, performing the
operation of projection on definable sets of real numbers yields definable sets of real numbers.
Cf. [Tarski, 1931, pp. 547–548 and 551–559]. The theory of projective sets was created
(according to [Sierpin´ski, 1950]) by N. Luzin in 1924 in Moscow (see [Luzin, 1925]). A
subset of a finite Cartesian product of R is Borelian, or Borel, iff it is in the least class
containing all open sets and closed under the operations of complementation and countable
union. A set is projective iff it is in the least class containing all Borel sets and closed under
the operations of complementation and projection.
10More specifically, existential quantification, as Tarski makes clear by the example he gives
immediately after.
11The projection of a Borel set is not necessarily Borel. Suslin introduced the analytic sets
in 1917. He showed that there were analytic non-Borel sets and proved that a set is analytic
iff it is the projection of a Borel set. See [Suslin, 1917].
12A negative answer to this question was given in [Kleene, 1950], where two disjoint re-
cursively enumerable sets of natural numbers were found which could not be separated by
any recursive set. The theory of recursive-function-theoretic hierarchies of sets of natural
numbers had had its origins in [Kleene, 1943], where what is known today as the arithmetical
hierarchy was introduced. Subsequently, but independently, Mostowski, who was Tarski’s
student in the 1930s, developed a version of the arithmetical hierarchy, basing his work at
least partially on analogies with the hierarchy of projective sets. He makes at least six ref-
erences to these analogies in his formulation of the theory, which appears in [Mostowski,
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1947]. But after learning of the result of [Kleene, 1950] Mostowski pointed out to Kleene
that the inseparability theorem of [Kleene, 1950] created a major breakdown in the analogy.
At Kleene’s suggestion, in the spring of 1952 his student John Addison investigated this
breakdownanddiscovered that a far closer analogy existedbetween the arithmetical hierarchy
and the finite Borel hierarchy. One of the keys to understanding and perfecting the analogy
was to consider the finite Borel hierarchy on the Baire space NN (which is isomorphic to
the set of functions from N to N under the product topology) rather than on the set of
real numbers. Using this analogy Kleene’s inseparability theorem corresponded exactly to
the inseparability theorem for the open subsets of the Baire space. Using the new analogy
Addison defined, in his dissertation [Addison, 1954], an “effective Borel hierarchy” on both
N and onNN and found that a unified treatment could be given for these two hierarchies and
the classical Borel hierarchy onNN. Moreover, it turnedout that this effectiveBorel hierarchy
on N was substantially the same as Kleene’s extension of his arithmetical hierarchy known
as the hyperarithmetical hierarchy (versions of which were also produced independently by
Davis and by Mostowski).
Addison isolated as “the fundamental principle of the analogies” (see also [Addison,
1959]) the fact that a function f fromNN intoNN is continuous iff there exists an element α
ofNN such thatf is recursive in α. He also defined an “effective Luzin hierarchy” onN and
on NN and gave a unified treatment of these with the classical projective hierarchy. These
effective hierarchies were equivalent to the “function-quantifier-hierarchies” of second-order
number theory which Kleene had been investigating independently.
To emphasize and clarify the close analogies between the classical Borel and projective
hierarchies and their “effective” counterparts Addison coined the term “effective descriptive
set theory” and introduced the uniform Σin ,Πin and Σin ,Πin notation for them (see [Addison,
1959]). Here the superscript i represents the order of the defining logical formulas, the
subscript n the number of alternating blocks of existential and universal quantifiers, and the
boldface represents that the defining formulas can include constant names for any elements
ofNN. Thus we have, for example,
N NN NN
recursive (= ∆01) recursive (effectively clopen = ∆
0
1) clopen (= ∆
0
1)
recursively enumerable (= Σ01) effectively open (= Σ
0
1) open (= Σ
0
1)
arithmetical arithmetical finite Borel
(= ∪{Σ0n : n ∈ "}) (= ∪{Σ0n : n ∈ "}) (= ∪{Σ0n : n ∈ "})
hyperarithmetical effectively Borel Borel
(= ∪{Σ0α : α ∈ "CK1 }) (= ∪{Σ0α : α ∈ "CK1 }) (= ∪{Σ0α : α ∈ "1})
Σ11 effectively analytic (= Σ
1
1) analytic (= Σ
1
1)
Σ12 effectively PCA (= Σ
1
2) PCA (= Σ
1
2)
analytical analytical projective
(= ∪{Σ1n : n ∈ "}) (= ∪{Σ1n : n ∈ "}) (= ∪{Σ1n : n ∈ "})
(Here, ∆01 is short for Σ
0
1 ∩Π01 (and similarly in the boldface case). The symbol "CK1 names
the Church-Kleene first nonconstructive ordinal. The class PCA is the class of projections of
complements of analytic sets. Finally, note that the terms “analytic” and “analytical”, which
arose in different theories, are quite distinct and name nonanalogous classes.)
13Tarski may have been led to consider this approach by one known similarity between the
Borel sets and the recursive sets. By a famous theorem of Suslin [Suslin, 1917] a set of real
numbers is Borel iff both it and its complement are analytic. Analogously a set of natural
numbers is recursive iff both it and its complement are recursively enumerable. But, as was
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noted in Note 12, a closer analogy exists between the Borel and the the hyperarithmetical
sets.
14Today, we have the following definitions:
(1) A subset X of Nn is a polynomial set iff its elements are the solutions of some Dio-
phantine equation f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0.
(2) A subset X ofNp is Diophantine iff it is the projection of a polynomial set Y ⊆ Nn+p.
Matijasevich proved in 1970 the following theorem: a subset X ofNp is recursively enumer-
able iff X is Diophantine. It follows that there is a Diophantine set which is not recursive
and hence there can be no effective general procedure for testing Diophantine equations to
determine whether they have integer solutions.
15It is not clear what operations Tarski may have had in mind here. The class of recursive
subsets of finite products ofN is closed, for example, under complementation, finite union,
finite intersection and bounded quantification, but closing out the class of polynomial sets
under these operations falls far short of exhausting the class of recursive sets. Indeed, no
very natural and useful hierarchy of all recursive sets of natural numbers has ever been found.
On the other hand there is a natural hierarchy of "CK1 of all recursive subsets of N
N which
is an effective analog of the so-called Kalmar hierarchy "1 of all clopen subsets of NN.
See [Kleene, 1958, Footnote 36] and [Barnes, 1965].
16It is not certain what Tarski had inmind here. If he is suggesting (as would appear to be the
case in view of the preceding sentences) that a hierarchy of all recursive sets might be found
by using an analogy with the projective hierarchy, then the idea has not materialized. But
note that computer scientists today consider a potentially interesting (although conceivably
degenerate) classification of a proper subclass of the class of recursive sets — the so-called
polynomial time hierarchy—which has been compared by some with the projective hierarchy.
Under this analogy the class NP (of sets of finite sequences of 0’s and 1’s decidable in
polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine) corresponds to the class of analytic
(Σ11) sets of infinite sequences of 0’s and 1’s.
17Tarski clearly has in mind that a “formal system” must be an effectively given one, so that,
for example, the set of axioms is effectively decidable, the rules of inference are effectively
calculable, etc.
18For example, the elementary theory of identity and the elementary theory of dense linear
orders are incomplete but decidable.
19The “adequacy of general recursiveness” refers to what is known today as “Church’s
thesis”, the explicit statement of which is in [Church, 1936a] and consists of identifying
the formal notion of “general recursiveness” and the vague intuitive notion of “effective
calculability”. Among the logicians present, Church, Kleene, and Go¨del would have been
obvious candidates to say something about that.
20Emil Post gave a proof of the validity of the truth-table method as a decision method,
in [Post, 1921]. The first explicit formulation of the method of truth tables for deciding
propositional validity of which we are aware is by Charles Sanders Peirce in [Peirce, 1885,
p. 191].
21This result may be dated from [Lo¨wenheim, 1915] and [Skolem, 1919] — see, for exam-
ple, [Tarski, 1948], [Ackermann, 1954] or [Church, 1956, pp. 292–293]. Later but indepen-
dently, Behmann proved the same result in [Behmann, 1922].
22This was first shown in [Church, 1936b]. In [Church, 1936a] Church proposed a formal
definition (now, following Kleene, known as “Church’s thesis”) of the vague intuitive notion
of “effectively calculable”. In [Church, 1936b] he showed that under this definition the
characteristic function of the set of valid sentences of the first-order predicate calculus is not
effectively calculable. See also [Turing, 1936] for his alternative definition (“Turing’s thesis”)
of “effectively calculable” and his proof that his class of functions and Church’s class are
equal.
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23There is no decision method which, for recursively given sets of propositional tautologies,
will determine whether or not all propositional tautologies can be derived from that set. The
first published work dealing with this is an abstract written by Emil Post and Samuel Linial
in [Linial and Post, 1949].
24On February 10, 1947McKinsey wrote to Tarski: “I’m afraid that the account of your own
talk could be much improved in some points. Especially in connection with the discussion of
many-valued logics. I don’t remember your having said that themany-valued logics originated
in the attempt of logicians to solve easier decision problems than the decision problem for
classical logic — and, though I’m never strong in history, it doesn’t seem to me that this is the
case.” We do not know how (or even if) Tarski responded to McKinsey’s letter. However,
it should be noted that Point 6 of the summary (A) (which we definitely know to have been
written by Tarski) does confirm that he intended to say something about “non-classical
systems of mathematical logic and their intuitive connection with the decision problem”.
First, let me recall here that Tarski gave a large meaning, in this talk, to the expression
“the decision problem” (see my introduction 3.1, p. 7 and 3.2.2, p. 12). In particular in
paragraph 〈15〉 below, “an undecidable proposition” means a proposition independent of a
given formalism. Now Łukasiewicz wrote in 1929: “Actually, it is the method of proving the
independence [my emphasis] of propositions in the theory of deduction which has occasioned
our researches into many-valued logics” (quoted by [Bochen´ski, 1961, p. 405]). Thus, using
Tarski’s way of speaking in this talk, we may say that the many-valued logics did originate in
the attempt to solve a “decision problem”.
25Tarski is referring here to the modal propositional logics introduced by Clarence I. Lewis.
Readers puzzled by Tarski’s inclusion of these logics under his discussion of many-valued
systems should look, for example, at [Lewis and Langford, 1932], where the “method of
matrices” (ormany-valued truth tables) is employed in the development of the Lewis systems.
26Tarski surely had in mind here the deductive systems Ln discussed in [Łukasiewicz and
Tarski, 1930] as well as McKinsey’s positive solution of the decision problem for the Lewis
systems S2 and S4: [McKinsey, 1941].
27See [Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936].
28On this issue (C) is slightly different: “Tarski felt that «The system of von Neumann and
Birkhoff seems to me to be the most interesting of these (non-classical logics), and the only
one which has any chance to replace our customary two-valued logic, since it is the only one
which has arisen from the needs of science».”
29At the present time this system is known to be undecidable. See [Roddy, 1989].
30Tarski was very likely alluding to a paper on undecidable diophantine propositions, which
was first published in [Go¨del, 1986–, vol. 3, pp. 156–175] along with an Introduction by
Martin Davis. This text was probably prepared between 1938 and 1940 for an undelivered
lecture. Go¨del’s result was reducing the form of definition of primitive recursive sets to those
in universal Diophantine form. According to Feferman’s remark: “if this is formalized in
Peano arithmetic (PA) it implies a «mathematical» independence result from PA”. As Davis
stresses in his Introduction (p. 161) “It is certainly remarkable that Go¨del had found a simple
undecidable class of statements about Diophantine equations a decade before anyone else
was giving the matter serious thought”.
31By “theorems” Tarski evidently means “statements”. Notice that the word ‘theorems’ is
also misused in the summary (A), Point 7.
32According to [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953, p. 11] T2 is an extension of T1, if
every sentence which is valid in T1 is also valid in T2. Now, what is a “natural” extension?
One possible answer is: extension by consistency statements, or more generally by reflection
principles.
33If one admits that reflection principles yield natural extensions, then this question is
answered by iterating such extensions effectively into the constructive transfinite, as first
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done by [Turing, 1939] and carried out by Feferman in his paper on recursive progressions
of theories [Feferman, 1962] — for historical information see [Feferman, 1988]. The answer
depends on the nature of the reflection principle chosen and also on which paths through the
Church-Kleene constructive ordinals are allowed.
34[Rosser, 1936] proved that no consistent extension of Peano arithmetic (PA) is decidable,
that is that PA is essentially undecidable. The notion of essentially undecidable theories was
formally introduced by Tarski’s abstract with that title in 1949 [Tarski, 1949a] and elaborated
in [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953]. PA is known to be interpretable in various
systemsof set theory; hence (byTheorems 7 and10), these systems are essentially undecidable.
Moreover, the subsystem Q obtained by replacing in PA the induction schema by the single
axiom (∀x)(x (= 0 → ∃y(x = Sy)) also is essentially undecidable (see [Mostowski and
Tarski, 1949b]). It follows that any consistent system in which Q is relatively interpretable is
essentially undecidable. This applies to quite weak systems of analysis and set theory, as was
shown by Szmielew and Tarski (see [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson, 1953, p. 34]).
35This decision procedurewas foundbyTarski between 1926 and 1930, announced in [Tarski,
1931], proved in [Tarski, 1939/1967], and published for the first time in [Tarski, 1948] — see
my introduction, 3.1.1(a).
36The decidability of the elementary theory of real numbers using the operations of addition,
multiplication, and exponentiation still is an open problem. For information about progress
on the problem see my introduction, 3.3.
37Tarski’s conjecture was confirmed by R. Solovay and S. Tennenbaum in [Solovay and
Tennenbaum, 1971] (for the statement of Suslin’s problem see my introduction, 3.3). In a
passage of his letter to Go¨del dated December 10, 1946 (quoted in my introduction, 3.2.3),
Tarski made a similar conjecture about the more famous continuum hypothesis.
38The question of natural extensions of set theory is a subject of even greater discussion and
debate today with some logicians proposing that ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the
axiom of choice) enriched with various so-called “large cardinal” axioms constitute “natural
extensions” of set theory. But even allowing such extensions as “natural”, both Suslin’s
hypothesis and the continuum hypothesis still remain candidates for absolutely undecidable
statements, that is ones that are independent in all “natural” extensions of ZFC.
39Tarski says, equivalently, “arithmetic” or “arithmetical”, “elementary”, and “first-order”.
Tarski had already used the notion of “arithmetical classes” in [Tarski, 1936, p. 241]. He
would give an explicit definition of this notion in 1950; see [Tarski, 1952]. Here, according to
the summary (A), Point 9, an “arithmetical property” is defined as “an elementarily definable
property”.
40By Tarski himself, probably in the year 1946 (see my introduction, 3.1.2). Let us add
that the elementary theory of rings, that of commutative rings, and that of ordered rings
are undecidable; see [Mostowski and Tarski, 1949b] and [Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson,
1953, pp. 33, 69–71].
41By Tarski’s student Wanda Szmielew in the 1940s (see my introduction, Note 19).
42As far as we know, Tarski’s first published announcement of the undecidability of the ele-
mentary theory of lattices came a few years after this talk, in [Tarski, 1949c]. In that abstract
Tarski outlines a proof using undecidability results of Julia Robinson in the arithmetic of the
rational numbers but he notes that the theorem itself is “an older result originally obtained
by an analogous method, but without the help of Mrs. Robinson’s results”.
43By Tarski in 1940.
44Tarski used the notion of “arithmetical equivalence” already in the 1930s. The definition
is to be found in the appendix to [Tarski, 1936] and in [Tarski, 1952].
45The answer to this question is: there are continuum many complete extensions of the
elementary theory of Abelian groups (see [Szmielew, 1955]). Let us note that this type of
question interested Tarski from his early days; see, for example, [Tarski, 1936, Section 4],
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concluding remarks on the ordered pair of cardinal numbers (α, #), which characterizes a
model of the axioms listed in Section 1, α being the power of the class of all complete
axiomatizable systems and # the power of the class of all complete non-axiomatizable systems.
46Let us recall Tarski’s early result on the elementary equivalence between the field of real
numbers and thefieldof real algebraic numbers (mentionned immediately afterCorollary 2.13
in [Tarski, 1939/1967, pp. 324–325]). Carrying out the program proposed here, Tarski
published [Tarski, 1952], which is “an outline of the general theory of arithmetical classes
and a discussion of some of its applications”. One question related to that program is, for
instance, the algebraic characterization of elementary equivalence. The first characterization
was the back-and-forth criterion given by Fraı¨sse´ in 1955, and independently by Ehrenfeucht
in 1961 andTaimanov in 1962. Other algebraic characterizations were by ultralimits (Kochen
in 1961) and by ultrapowers (Keisler in 1964 assuming the generalized continuum hypothesis
and Shelah in 1971 without it). Another question may be the preservation of elementary
equivalence under algebraic operations such as generalized products. There were early results
by Mostowski and Fraı¨sse´, but the definitive result is in [Feferman and Vaught, 1959].
(B2)
Discussion in the conference of logic held at Princeton,
December 17, 1946.∗
〈1〉 After the prepaired talks the chairman, Prof. Church, made several
remarks on the subjects mentioned, which led into general discussion.
〈2〉 Church began by emphasizing the critical aspects of Rosser’s talk with
respect to the Birkhoff-vonNeumann suggestion that amany-valued logic be
used to formulate theoretical quantum mechanics. He stressed the fact that
such a proposal cannot be considered seriously unless it includes a “many-
valued” formulation of quantification and set theory as well as a changed
sentential (propositional) calculus.
〈3〉 Go¨del raised the question: Is there any difficulty in setting up a formal
system in which ordinary logic is retained for mathematical propositions
and non-Aristotelian logic applied only to propositions about physical facts?
Church aggreed that a proceduremight be developedwhereby the classical, as
well as somemany-valued, propositional calculuswere incorporated into one
system, and the ordinary quantification-theory constructed as an extension
of this. However, he stressed that unless such a program is carried through in
detail the enterprise must be considered unsatisfactory. These same general
criticisms apply to other non-classical systems such as those of Reichenbach,
Fevrier, and Strauss.
〈4〉 Church next commented on Go¨del’s talk and examined the frequent
suggestion that finitary rules of inference and formation be relaxed, and
transfinite rules admitted, in order to escape the classical Go¨del incomplete-
ness results (or for other reasons). He emphasized that while such systems
∗The document was apparently prepared along with (B1) from the same information
(notes or tape recording). In the title, “conference” is evidently an oversight; it should be
“session”.
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might have considerable interest of one kind or another, they could not prop-
erly be considered logics, insofar as logics explicate the notion of proof. For
what we mean by a proof is something which carries finality of conviction
to any one who admits the assumptions (axioms and rules) on which the
proof is based; and this requires that there be an effective (finitary, recursive)
syntactical test of the validity of proposed proofs.
〈5〉 Church asserted that while a determined sceptic could always insist
on doubting, there were “reasonable” grounds for doubting in some cases
but not in others. In particular he stated that in case that “proof” was
characterized by transfinite conditions an observer might always ask for a
proof that a proposed “proof” did indeed satisfy the transfinite conditions;
whereas in the case of effective conditions the observer is always able to
check directly by a mechanical procedure.
〈6〉 Go¨del replied by first pointing out that his talk was not concerned
with setting up a formal system, but with the probelm of setting up a theory
of the whole transfinite series of stronger and stronger formal systems for
mathematics.
〈7〉With respect to the question whether a proof is required that a given
sequence of sentences is a proof, Go¨del said there would be no difference
between the scheme he proposed and a finitary characterization of the ax-
ioms; but that the difference would rather lie in the fact that in the second (as
opposed to the first) case there is always complete agreement, even among
mathematicians of the most divergent philosophical views, as to whether
some given sequence is a proof in the sense defined. Furthermore, he re-
marked that in the scheme he proposed (assuming it can be carried out)
there would even exist recursive conditions characterizing, not the axioms,
but the axioms and their negations, so that if this condition were satisfied for
a sentence A, either A or ¬A would be recognizable as true without proof,
by a mere consideration of the meaning of the terms occurring.
〈8〉 Later Tarksi, commenting on this exchange, said that he agreed with
Church’s thesis but with Go¨del’s mode of argumentation. He thought that
within the philosophical framework of idealism Go¨del’s position could be
consistently maintained and that a philosophical position of empiricism
should be used to buttress Church’s contentions. Church denied that his
thesis required the support of empiricism or other special philosophy.
〈9〉 In commenting on Tarski’s discussion of the decision problem Church
emphasized the desirability of obtaining unsolvability proofs for various
particular problems in the different branches of mathematics. In topology,
for example, such a problem as “to find a complete set of invariants for
3-dimensional closed simplicial manifolds” is actually a disguised form of
a decision problem, namely to decide for an arbitrary pair of such mani-
folds (as given, say, by incident matrices) whether they are homeomorphic.
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For this, or other problems like it, it may be possible to obtain absolute
unsolvability proofs.
〈10〉 Church thought that an attempt should be made in some sense to
draw the line between mathematical problems which are solvable and those
which are not. However he conjectured that the problem, to find an effective
method of deciding in all cases whether a given problem is solvable, is not
solvable.
〈11〉 An example of a specific problem which had been seriously proposed
for solution in a methematical context (by Thue, 1914) and then proved
unsolvable (by Post, unpublished) was given by Church:
〈12〉 Consider a system consisting of a set of symbols a1, a2, . . . , an and
a set of equations A1 = A2, A3 = A4, . . . , Am−1 = Am, where the Aj are
“words” —i.e., finite sequences of the ai . The problem is to find a method
for deciding, for an arbitrary such system and an arbitrary pair of its words,
whether the words can be transformed into each other by a finite sequence of
substitutions employing the given equations as axioms. The word problem
of group theory is a special case of the above where n = 2r and all relations
aian+i = 1 and an+i ai = 1 (where “1” denotes the null word) are among the
given equations. In this case the symbols are taken to be generators and the
equations, defining relations for the group. Whether the decision problem
for this special case is solvable is not known. Tarksi pointed out that Thue’s
problem may be regarded as the word problem for semi-groups.
〈13〉 The question was asked of Go¨del whether it might not be possible to
obtain an absolute definition of definability based on the constructive ordi-
nals rather than on all ordinals, and thus avoid some of Church’s objections
to transfinite methods in “linguistic” operations. Go¨del said that assuming
classical mathematics to be a meaningful theory (not a mere play with sym-
bols) there cannot exist any mathematical definition of definability allowing
only denumerably many definable ordinals (because of the argument of the
least undefinable ordinal). He went on to say that in his opinion classical
mathematics has meaning (i.e., describes some reality) and that failure to
assume this (at least as a working hypothesis) must psychologically work as
a hindrance in research.
〈14〉 At Dr. F. Mautner’s request Tarski expanded his description of the
arithmetical properties of algebraic structures. He showed how one can
make use of a general theorem of Skolem to establish the existence of certain
infinite models.
〈15〉Mr. P.Wachtell askedwhether a proof of the unsolvability of Fermat’s
Theoremwould not imply its truth, since its falsity would permit a calculable
disproof. Kleene, answering in the affirmative, explained that this was a case
in which an unsolvability proof relative to a given system led to an extension
of the system by the addition of a statement true in the classical sense. He
pointed out that there are examples of statements which are true classically
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but not realizable, so that a system in which such a statement is not decided
may admit different extensions according as classical or intuitionistic truth
is taken as the basis.
〈16〉 The occurrence in this discussion of the phrase “the strongest formal
system for mathematics known at present” prompted Go¨del to remark that
such a system cannot exist, because, if any system is given, the system
obtained by adding the proposition that the given system is consistent is
stronger, and the new axiom must be acknowledged as a true proposition if
the axioms of the given system are acknowledged as true.
〈17〉 This suggested to Tarski the question: what must be added to a
system for number theory to get the strength equivalent to that obtained
by imbedding the system in a logic of higher type? Mr. L. Henkin stated
that any proposition of the extended logic could be expressed in the simpler
system providing a predicate P(x, y) was added as a primitive notion, where
P(x, y) holds just for pairs of numbers such that x and y are Go¨del numbers
(in some standard correspondence between numbers and the formulas of the
logic of higher type) which denote the same entity.
(C)
Mathematical logic.†
Here the discussion revolved about a single broad topic — decision prob-
lems. The notion of a decision method is a formalization of the classical
notion of an algorithm. The known equivalence of Turing’s “computabil-
ity”, defined in terms of a very general computing machine, Herbrand and
Go¨del’s “general recursiveness”, and Church’s “$-definability” has led to
general agreement on the natural formalization of the notion of an algo-
rithm. More and more decision problems are being shown to be unsolvable,
in the sense that there exists no algorithmwith the required properties. While
the general mathematician has to regard this as somewhat negative progress,
it is real progress, not only for mathematical logic but for other fields of
mathematics as well.
The nearest approach to a proof of unsolvability for a problem of impor-
tance in other fields is the recent theorem of Post that the word problem
in semi-groups is insoluble. Such results have encouraged mathematical lo-
gicians to go further and try to show that problems of a more standard
mathematical character are unsoluble. In his summary, Church suggested
the word problem for groups and the problems of giving a complete set of
topological invariants for knots and for closed simplicial manifolds of di-
mension n as likely possibilities. Theorems are needed to characterize or
provide criteria for the distinction between solvable and unsolvable decision
†The following account and the program reprinted below, pp. 38–39, are excerpted from
the Pamphlet, Problems of Mathematics, printed by the Princeton University in 1947.
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problems (though to find a decision method is no doubt itself an insoluble
decision problem).
Closely related to the decision problem for theories is the question of
whether or not particular questions are decidable in a given theory. It was
pointed out that in particular the ReimannHypothesis might be undecidable
in a particular theory, but that the flexible position of the general mathemati-
cian would prevent its ever becoming demonstrably undecidable for him.
The analogy between generally recursive sets of integers and Borel sets
of real numbers was stressed by Tarski, who pointed out the possibilities of
proving analogous theorems and of developing a single theory to include
both as special cases. Tarski then surveyed the status of the decision prob-
lem in various logical fields: sentential (propositional) calculus, predicate
(functional) calculus, many-valued systems of sentential calculus, number
theory, analysis, general set theory, and various abstract algebraic systems.
In all of these, even in two-valued sentential calculus, where we would like
to be able to decide when a set of formulas is an adequate axiom system, he
pointed out open, important problems.
No formal system, with the usual restrictions, which is strong enough to
deal with the arithmetic of integers can be complete (Go¨del 1931), it must
contain undecidable propositions. This led Go¨del to propose a particular
tremendous enlargement of the notion of a formal system — which would
allow uncountably many primitive notions and allow the notion of an axiom
to depend on the notion of truth. “I do not feel sure that the set of all things
of which we can think is denumerable.”
This led to a spirited discussion led by Church and Go¨del, which centered
on the non-mathematical questions of what could reasonably be called a
“proof” and when a listener could “reasonably” doubt a proof. From a
psychological point of view the discussion resembled the classical debates
on intuitionism to a remarkable degree; Church arguing for finiteness and
security and Go¨del arguing for the ability to obtain results.
Kleene discussed the limitations which general recursiveness may place on
quantitative proof. McKinsey discussed the criticisms of general recursive-
ness as the formalization of the notion of an algorithm.
Quine proposed to evade the undecidability of arithmetic by studying
a restrictive arithmetic without quantifiers, which might have a decision
method. It was pointed out that, in particular, Fermat’s Last Theorem
could be expressed in such a system. The corresponding problem for a
partial system of real numbers without quantifiers was proposed as an open
problem.
The subject of non-classical logic recurred throughout the session, with rel-
atively favorable words for the quantum-mechanical system of Birkhoff and
von Neumann. Tarski felt that “The system of von Neumann and Birkhoff
seems to me to be the most interesting of these (non-classical logics), and
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the only one which has any chance to replace our customary two-valued
logic, since it is the only one which has arisen from the needs of science”.
Rosser discussed the problems involved in applying a many-valued logic, for
example Reichenbach’s, to all the steps which lead up to quantum mechan-
ics, including truth-function theory (propositional calculus), quantification
theory (functional calculus), set theory, theory of the positive integers, the-
ory of real numbers, theory of limits and functions, theory of Hilbert space,
theory of quantummechanics. The initial steps have shown a great tendency
of the theory to ramify, single notions in the classical theory corresponding
to more and more distinct notions as one passes to more and more complex
theories. Go¨del proposed using the two kinds of logic, each in its place.
Church would accept this proposal for consideration, only if a single logistic
system were constructed providing syntactical criteria by which the place of
each kind of logic is fixed. He felt that all non-classical logics faced great
difficulties in such applications.
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